



1.   INTRODUCTION
Th e general characteristics of the modern world 
are rapid, dynamic and very diverse changes in 
all aspects of social life. Th ese are determined 
primarily by the development of technology that 
provides the infrastructure for these changes. Th e 
dynamics and trends observed at the general soci-
al level have a strong impact on the military and 
security fi eld. A conclusion can be drawn that “the 
last twenty years have been the period of constant 
and dynamic changes in the fi eld of security in all 
aspects, ranging from various threats to partici-
pants and referent objects of security at the nati-
onal and international level.” (Tatalović, Malnar, 
2016). Th e military, defense and security sectors 
are the ones which, have historically generated 
and encouraged signifi cant technological inno-
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vations that were subsequently applied in the civil 
sector. Besides giving the dynamics and reach to 
existing threats, technological development multi-
plies them and generates new threats. It also provi-
des platforms and instruments to counter security 
threats. Particularly important are the advent of 
new technologies and the manner in which those 
technologies are used, such as nuclear technology, 
which signifi cantly and unexpectedly change the 
character of the security environment - disrupti-
ve technologies - and determine new approaches 
to the understanding of security and the way in 
which security policies are defi ned. 
Th ere are, of course, numerous views on the relati-
onship and interdependence between technology 
and security. American political scientist Bracken 
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claims that “one common view, particularly in 
political science and social science departments, 
is that technology doesn’t make much diff erence 
at all - we should think more about strategy and 
be smart, rather than buy technology to gain ca-
pabilities we would not otherwise have” (Bracken, 
2019). On the other hand, security practitioners 
from the political sphere have completely oppo-
site views. Vladimir Putin, referring to artifi cial 
intelligence, asserted that “artifi cial intelligence is 
the future, not only for Russia, but for all human-
kind. (…) Whoever becomes the leader in this 
sphere will become the ruler of the world“ (CNN, 
2017). Th e European Commission emphasizes 
another feature of artifi cial intelligence that other 
technologies did not have, for instance nuclear 
technology despite all its signifi cance,which is that 
“like electricity in the past, artifi cial intelligence 
transforms our world” (European Commission, 
2018: 1). Th e potentials and signifi cance of artifi -
cial intelligence are also confi rmed by the ambiti-
ons of China. In its development plan for artifi cial 
intelligence, China identifi es artifi cial intelligence 
as a critical technology due to its military and eco-
nomic potential. Based on the assessment that “ra-
pid development of artifi cial intelligence will tho-
roughly change social life and the world”, China 
defi nes the development of artifi cial intelligence 
as a “national strategic interest” with the goal of 
“leadership at the international level by 2030” (PR 
China State Council, 2017a). 
Potentials of new technologies and ambitions of 
individual states can generate new threats, but at 
the same time, they open up new opportunities in 
countering threats, both emerging and traditional. 
Based on such claims, the NATO sets the goal „ 
to harness emerging and disruptive technologies 
at a speed of relevance to thwart adversaries and 
protect NATO’s populations“ (NATO Industry 
Forum, 2018: 1). However, as with all novelties, 
access to new technologies is neither straight-
forward nor linear. Even among the NATO Allies, 
there are disputes and diff erences. Th is is confi r-
med by a dispute between the US and Germany 
aft er the Trump administration warned Germany 
that “if it allows China’s tech giant Huawei to en-
ter the German market, security cooperation and 
even intelligence sharing could be at stake” (VOA, 
2019). Dilemmas about new technologies and po-
tential suppliers also exist in the internal politics 
of states. In the UK, for example, the defense se-
cretary Gavin Williamson was fi red by the British 
Prime Minister Th eresa May over the leaking of a 
key decision from a UK National Security Coun-
cil meeting related to the Chinese telecommuni-
cations company Huawei, which determined that 
the British prime minister would allow Huawei 
to build the British telecommunications network 
(CNN, 2019). 
Modern technological development creates com-
plex security relationships in which countries face 
both the challenges of following technological 
development and countering threats, especially 
small and technologically less advanced countries 
such as Croatia.
In order to defi ne the responses to security threats 
and challenges triggered by technological deve-
lopments, the paper analyzes key strategic docu-
ments for the security of the US, Russia, China, 
Croatia and member states of theNATO and the 
EU to determine whether and how these entities 
identify disruptive technologies as a security thre-
at and how they approach them.
2.   DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES - 
CHARACTERISTICS AND HOLDERS
In discussing technologies and their impact on 
the security paradigm, we distinguish two fun-
damental technological areas, namelysustaining 
and disruptive technologies. Certain technologies 
reinforce the power of the industry leader. Others 
disrupt that position. Sustaining technologies are 
those that support the day-to-day processes, pro-
ducts, services, capabilities or power of the indu-
stry, the military, etc. Th ey evolve and improve 
evolutionarily (Bracken, 2019). O the other hand, 
disruptive technologies are those that bring new 
technology and / or enable or enhance a product, 
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service, ability or power in an unexpected way or 
bring an unexpected change in the use of existing 
technology (e.g. tactics of using tanks by the Ger-
man military in World War II). In the business 
domain, disruptive innovations create a new mar-
ket and value networks,eventually disrupting an 
existing market and value networks anddisplacing 
the leading fi rms, products, alliances and business 
models on the established market (NATO, 2018: 
18). It is about the “technology that enhances a 
product or service in a way that the market does 
not expect“(Bidwell, MacDonald, 2018). Disrup-
tive technologies are therefore technological inno-
vations and ways of using them that signifi cantly 
change the paradigms of relationships in a parti-
cular sphere. Unlike sustaining technologies, dis-
ruptive ones have a revolutionary character in the-
ir appearance and the eff ect on the environment. 
In this way, disruptive technologies signifi cantly 
change the character of the security environment, 
the understanding of security, and the manner in 
which security policies are defi ned.
It should be emphasized that the disruptive natu-
re of a technology can be seen from a number of 
levels, those international, regional, and even na-
tional ones. 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned controversy 
over the installation and use of technology off ered 
by the Chinese technology company Huawei rai-
ses several signifi cant questions regarding techno-
logies, especially disruptive technologies.
Th e fi rst and very important, which suggests new 
relations in the sphere of security is that unlike 
earlier periods when the carriers of technological 
developments, especially those with security con-
sequences, were in the defense and the state sector, 
nowadays the holders of development are in the 
private sphere, “innovation happens in research 
laboratories, industry and universities” (Mitchell, 
2009). Th is fact produces a very complex relati-
onship between the states (national interest) and 
the private sector (business interest) with regard 
to the developments.. Civilian technology has 
evolved so much and surpassed military that the 
military sector “since the late 20th century, (...) has 
been increasingly seeking the development of new 
technologies by the civilian sector in order to gain 
technological advantage” (Mitchell, 2009). Private 
companies, led by high tech companies, play an 
important role in technological development, and 
their fi nancial power goes beyond most countries. 
Th ese companies are international and operate all 
over the world. It is oft en very diffi  cult to deter-
mine the ownership structure. Th ey provide their 
services on a commercial supply and demand ba-
sis that strengthens the possibility of uncontrolled 
proliferation of technology. Global companies and 
organizations have become so powerful that they 
can even condition states. Th is reduces the possi-
bility of state control and intervention and sets 
in motionthe threat of technology proliferation 
towards individuals and organizations which are 
the carriers of various threats, such as terrorism or 
organized crime. In this way, the dependence of 
states on the private sector is reinforced and com-
petition is transferred to the non-military sector.
Th e second is that the development of these tech-
nologies, and even the leadership in the deve-
lopment of particular technologies, also occurs 
in countries with questionable democratic po-
tential or countries that are not democratic, such 
asChina. Th is opens a new area of threat through 
the exploitation and misuse of private companies 
by the state, including intelligence and interests. 
Th e confi rmation of such concerns can be found 
in the case of China. Specifi cally, Article 7 of the 
Chinese National Law on Intelligence states that 
“all organizations and citizens shall, in accordan-
ce with the law, provide support and assistance, 
co-operate with the State Intelligence Service, and 
keep secret national intelligence activities known 
to them” (PR China National People’s Congress, 
2017b). China is thus in a comparative advantage 
over democratic countries that lack such oppor-
tunities.
We can talk about three groups of threat carriers 
associated with disruptive technologies: states, 
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especially those dominant in the development of 
particular technologies, dominant and leading 
private corporate entities, non-state actors, orga-
nizations and individuals.
2.1.    Modern disruptive technologies
Although the term disruptive technologies itself is 
relatively new, fi rst mentioned in 1995 at Harvard 
by Joseph L. Bower and Clayton M. Christensen, 
technologies with disruptive characteristics can 
be observed throughout human history. One of 
the more prominent historical examples of a dis-
ruptive technology is the emergence of nuclear 
weapons. Th is technology has been defi ning  the 
global security environment, security policies, and 
international relations in general, ever since its 
fi rst appearance in the mid 20th century.
Th e technology that has characterized the 21st 
century is undoubtedly the Internet. With its 
appearance, the Internet has met the criteria for 
being a disruptive technology with its accom-
panying eff ects. Th e advent of the Internet has had 
an enormous disruptive impact. Th e Internet has 
enabled global communication connectivity, an 
unprecedented potential for information transfer, 
“the Internet enables information to be shared, 
modifi ed, interpreted and developed by everyone 
(...)” (Mitchell, 2009). Th e Internet has ultimately 
enabled globalization as a process of redefi ning 
global international relations, thereby infl uencing 
the perception and defi nition of security policies. 
Th e Internet itself is no longer a disruptive techno-
logy today. It provides a platform and infrastructu-
re necessary for the development and application 
and operation of new disruptive technologies.
What in the Cold War was an arms race, in today’s 
world it is certainly a race for the development of 
an advanced non-military technology that would 
allow an entity possessing or developing it to do-
minate the world.
Developing technologies that have the potential to 
become disruptive technologies, and as such may 
represent security challenges and threats in the 
future primarily include: artifi cial intelligence, 5G 
networks, quantum computing, 3D printing, the 
Internet of Th ings, nanotechnology, hyper velo-
city, biotechnology, and robotics.
Th is analysis will primarily focus on data-related 
technologies that enhance data collection, proce-
ssing and use through multiplication of quantity, 
speed, automation and autonomy. Central is the 
development of artifi cial intelligence, as a techno-
logy that will largely represent the precondition 
and platform for the development of other tech-
nologies. Th erefore, the development of artifi cial 
intelligence is the basis for gaining dominance on 
the global level.
Artifi cial intelligence (AI) refers to systems that 
exhibit intelligent behavior by analyzing their 
environment and taking action - with a degree of 
autonomy - to achieve specifi c goals (European 
Commission, 2018).
Th e scope of application for artifi cial intelligence 
is apparent from the Chinese Plan for the De-
velopment of Artifi cial Intelligence. It includes 
setting up an open and coordinated artifi cial in-
telligence science and technology innovation 
system encompassing big data intelligence theory, 
cross-media perceptual computing theory, hybrid 
augmented intelligence theory, group intelligen-
ce basic theory, coordinated control and decisi-
on-making theory, advanced machine learning 
theory, brain-like intelligence computing theory, 
quantum intelligence computing theory. Likewi-
se, knowledge computing engine and knowledge 
service technology, cross-media analytic reaso-
ning technology, key group intelligence techno-
logy, new structure and new technology of hybrid 
augmented intelligence, autonomous man-less 
system technology, virtual reality intelligence mo-
deling technology, intelligence computing chip 
and system and natural language processing tech-
nology are all included in the system (PR China 
State Council, 2017a).
Th e development of artifi cial intelligence genera-
tes positive and negative consequences. Th e po-
sitive side undoubtedly involves the processing 
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and derivation of meaning from a large number 
of unstructured data, accurate identifi cation of 
processes and phenomena, advanced generaliza-
tion and visualization of content, links, risks and 
threats, an increase in the capacity to identify 
counterfeit and false data, etc. At the same time, 
from a security standpoint, there are also nume-
rous concerns related to strengthening the ability 
to infl uence  thedemocratic processes, economic 
security and social stability,the structure of em-
ployment, the breach of privacy or to enable the 
advanced abuse of autonomous weapons. It could 
raise the potential for the development of biotech-
nological threats, cyber threats, creation of virtual 
reality and virtual identities through the generati-
on of fake news, information, and falsifi cation of 
media records, and advanced forms of espionage. 
It could lead to automation of threats.
Artifi cial intelligence gains its full potential thro-
ugh interconnection with Internet data transmi-
ssion. Th erefore, the development and installati-
on of 5G networks is imposed as a precondition 
and almost a form of critical infrastructure for 
the development of the full potential of artifi ci-
al intelligence. 5G networks are high frequency 
networks that increase the connectivity of the de-
vice by both fi ft een times in terms of the number 
of connected devices, speed and reduction of res-
ponse time. Th is creates new opportunities for the 
development of other technologies such as robo-
tics, laser technologies and fi nally the Internet of 
Th ings that acquire the full scope of disruptiveness 
through synergy.
3.   DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
IN STRATEGIC SECURITY DOCU-
MENTS
National security strategies as the basic strategic 
security documents of a given state are the best in-
dicators of how states defi ne threats and how they 
develop the concept of national security policies 
based on defi ned threats.
An analysis of public discourse shows that the 
major global powers that house the world’s le-
ading technology companies are giving greater 
importance to disruptive threats than smaller, po-
orer, and technologically less developed countries. 
Th e Russian and Chinese President’s assessments 
of the importance of artifi cial intelligence are an 
example of this. Another example is also the dis-
cussion between the US and European partners 
about the previously mentioned Huawei company 
and concerns that their technology could be used 
for spying by the Chinese government.
3.1.    The United States of America
Th e US national security strategy places techno-
logy on an equal footing with political, military, 
and economic factors, demonstrating the impor-
tance given to technology in the context of natio-
nal security. It starts with the assessment that the 
US military is still the strongest in the world, while 
also noting that the US advantage is diminishing 
as rival countries modernize. It is estimated that 
“(…) access to technology empowers and embol-
dens otherwise weak states” (White House, 2017: 
3). Th is is followed by an assessment that “tech-
nology is an opportunity for strengthening the 
leading position that the United States have in the 
world, but also a threat that other countries will 
develop and threaten the position of the United 
States and their national interests. Losing our (US) 
innovation and technological edge would have far-
reaching negative implications for American pros-
perity and power (White House, 2017: 21)”.
Th e US National Security Strategy mentions and 
recognizes new technologies that will be of para-
mount or even crucial importance in the near fu-
ture for gaining or retaining the leading position 
in the world, with particular reference to “data sci-
ence, encryption, autonomous technologies, gene-
tic engineering, new materials, nanotechnology, 
advanced computing technologies, and artifi cial 
intelligence“ (White House, 2017: 20). Th ese are 
potentially disruptive technologies and therefore, 
given the disruptive nature of these technologies, 
the measures off ered by the strategy should also 
be considered in that respect: preventing the fall 
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of sensitive technology into the hands of hostile 
actors (terrorists and US enemies), capitalizing on 
new technologies, retaining the ability to produce 
high technology, overseeing the development of 
military technologies outside the defense sector 
in private companies, paying attention to China 
and the development of Chinese technology.An 
important tool defi ned by the strategy for the 
purpose of preserving security is that the US “will 
encourage scientists in the government, academia, 
and in the private sector to achieve advancements 
across the full spectrum of discovery, from incre-
mental improvements to game-changing breakt-
hroughs” (White House, 2017: 20).
3.2.   Russia
Like the US, Russia has recognized the impor-
tance of technology as a factor of national secu-
rity and national interests. Th e Russian strategy 
is somewhat diff erent from the United States’ one 
in form, but it mentions technology as an impor-
tant item in almost all chapters and fi elds. Th e 
strategy starts with an assessment of how tech-
nology will aff ect both the present and the future 
and emphasizes that the “new forms of unlawful 
activity are emerging, particularly those involving 
the utilization of informational, communications 
and high technologies” (Russian Federation Pre-
sident, 2015: 5). Th e strategy places science and 
technology among the primary national interests 
to be pursued for the advancement of the country. 
As in the case of the US, Russia’s national security 
strategy mentions technologies that are given the 
highest regard in the security context, stating that 
to achieve its goals it is necessary to ensure “the 
development of promising high technologies (ge-
netic engineering, robotic engineering, biologi-
cal, information, communications and cognitive 
technologies, nanotechnologies, and convergent 
technologies that resemble Nature).”(Russian Fe-
deration President, 2015: 17). 
As with the US, although not explicitly stated, the-
se are technologies that by defi nition fall within 
the scope of those we have defi ned as disruptive.
Although in its strategy Russia has not fully addre-
ssed the potential threats posed by disruptive tech-
nologies and the ways they could aff ect national 
security and national interests, and thus does have 
not have fully developed the ways of responding 
to potential threats, science and technology have 
been placed as a high priority. Special emphasis is 
put on “the development of cooperation between 
educational organizations and scientifi c research 
centers and industrial enterprises and the practice 
of co-founding by the state and by enterpreneurs 
for long-term (…)” (Russian Federation Presi-
dent, 2015: 17).  
3.3.   China
As a direct competitor to the US and Russia, China 
has gradually grown and made signifi cant advan-
ces in technology. Due to the specifi c features of 
the Chinese system and the high degree of clo-
sedness still exhibited by it; it is diffi  cult to reach 
strategic security documents that would enable 
the analysis of strategic security views on disrupti-
ve technologies. However, by analyzing the public 
sources, the statements made by the offi  cials and 
other documents, it is possible to conclude that 
China has prioritized technology in fulfi lling na-
tional interests and national security. Th e Chinese 
strategy aims to advance the technological sector 
and reach the leading position in the world and 
on the markets. China is spending billions of do-
llars on science and technology, developing rese-
arch in genomics, quantum computing, robotics, 
and advanced materials. Beijing’s “Made in China 
2025” industrial policy seeks to position China as 
a high-tech global superpower (Forbes, 2019a). 
It is important to note that President Xi Jinping 
himself emphasized how China’s future lies pre-
cisely in technology. Chinese President Xi Jinping 
said at a Politburo “group study” session about AI 
that China must develop, control and use artifi cial 
intelligence (AI) to secure the country’s future in 
the next technological and industrial revolution. 
Xi said that China must develop its own AI tech-
nology, saying it was important for economic de-
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velopment, social progress and global geopolitics. 
“AI is a vital driving force (…) and accelerating 
AI development is a strategic issue  (…). Under 
the plan, China aims to match the world’s leading 
powers in AI by 2020; lead the world in certain as-
pects of the technology by 2025, and be the world’s 
leading power in AI by 2030” (South China Mor-
ning Post, 2018). 
China recognizes the potential of modern disrup-
tive technologies and uses them as a platform in an 
attempt to achieve global domination.
3.4. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization)
Th e Strategic Concept is an offi  cial document that 
outlines the NATO’s enduring purpose and natu-
re, as well as its fundamental security tasks. It also 
identifi es the central features of the new security 
environment and specifi es the elements of the 
Alliance’s approach to security (NATO, 2018a). 
NATO Strategic Concept is not as comprehensive 
as national security strategies of individual coun-
tries. Th e current 2010 Strategic Concept titled 
“Active Engagement, Modern Defense” identifi es 
some disruptive technologies, assessing that “a 
number of signifi cant technology-related trends 
– including the development of laser weapons, 
electronic warfare and technologies that impede 
access to space – appear poised to have major glo-
bal eff ects that will have an impact on NATO mi-
litary planning and operations” (NATO, 2010: 4).
Disruptive technologies are not explicitly men-
tioned in this document. Th e document deals 
with emerging technologies, defi nes the concept, 
but does not single out individual technologies. 
NATO aims to provide “a full range of capabilities 
important to deter and defend against any threat”. 
To achieve this, it is necessary to “ensure that the 
Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the se-
curity impact of emerging technologies, and that 
military planning takes the potential threats into 
account” (NATO, 2010: 5). Th e comprehensivene-
ss that NATO attaches to disruptive technologies 
is evident through the Alliance’s various thema-
tic forums. An example of this is the 2018 NATO 
Industry Forum held in Berlin, which discussed 
issues related to industry and the economy and 
where the discussion of disruptive technologies 
received central attention based on the assessment 
that “disruptive technologies are moving to the 
forefront of the modern security environment” 
(NATO, 2018). Th e Forum assessed that “in the 
business domain, disruptive innovations create a 
new market and value network, which eventually 
disrupts the existing market and value network, 
and replaces market leaders, products, alliances 
and business models”. It was accordingly conclu-
ded that “disruptive technologies in the military 
domain enable new concepts and capabilities, al-
ter the operational balance and negate or disrupt 
existing capabilities” (NATO, 2018).
Th rough Science and Technology Organization 
(STO), NATO therefore generates and exploits 
a cutting edge science and technology operatio-
nal program, delivering timely results and advice 
that advance the defence capabilities of individu-
al Allies, partners and the overall organization in 
support of the core tasks of collective defence, cri-
sis management and cooperative security (NATO, 
2019).
 3.5.   European Union
Th e European Union did not recognize the issue 
of disruptive technologies in the 2003 European 
Security Strategy, a document which istoday so-
mewhat outdated.. However, this does not mean 
that the European Union as such does not take 
into account the growing technologies that will 
be revolutionary in the future and extremely im-
portant for security on a global scale. Th e Euro-
pean Commission’s plan on Artifi cial Intelligence 
outlines important points for the development 
and study of artifi cial intelligence in the European 
Union, whichis of particular importance as a po-
tential disruptive technology given its widespread 
use (European Commission, 2018).
Th e Europe 2020 Strategy places extreme emphasis 
on technological development, while identifying 
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technologies that will be highly relevant in the fu-
ture.. To achieve industrial leadership, the EU will 
strengthen industrial competitiveness in informa-
tion and communications technology, space-re-
lated technologies and six key technologies that 
will signifi cantly contribute to the innovation and 
competitiveness of European products: nanotech-
nology, microelectronics and nanoelectronics, 
photonics, advanced materials, biotechnology and 
advanced manufacturing systems“ (Car, 2015: 67).
A 2016 document titled Global Strategy for the 
European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy 
shows that the European Union is determined to 
play a greater role in technological advancements 
and security (European Union, 2016). Th e docu-
ment mentions new disruptive technologies and 
emphasizes that “global rules are also necessary in 
fi elds such as biotechnology, artifi cial intelligence, 
robotics and remotely piloted systems, to avoid 
the related security risks and reap their economic 
benefi ts” (European Union, 2016: 43). Unlike the 
US, which takes a confrontational stance towar-
ds China, the EU sees increasing security throu-
gh the development of cooperation, as outlined 
in the Strategy: “the EU will promote exchanges 
with relevant multilateral fora to help spearhead 
the development of rules and build partnerships 
at the frontiers of global aff airs” (European Uni-
on, 2016:43).  For China as a major competitor of 
EU, thismeans cooperation based on “the deepe-
ning of trade and investment with China, seeking 
a level playing fi eld, intellectual property rights 
protection, greater cooperation regarding high-
end technology, dialogue on economic reform, 
human rights and climate action” (European Uni-
on, 2016:38). It is important to emphasize that the 
European Union has a much larger range of tools 
at its disposal in terms of dealing with disruptive 
technologies than the NATO.
3.6. Neighboring countries of the Republic 
of Croatia
Smaller countries in the vicinity of Croatia, with 
similar historical, geographical, political and other 
characteristics such as Slovenia, Hungary and Ser-
bia do not treat disruptive technology at the same 
level as the analyzed documents of the USA, Ru-
ssia, China, NATO and the EU.
In its national security strategy, the Republic of 
Slovenia deals with technology issues at the ge-
neral level as an important component of natio-
nal interests and security, mostly in relation to 
other threats. What is particularly emphasized are 
thenuclear and rocket technologies, cyber thre-
ats, and misuse of information technology and 
systems (Državni zbor, 2019). Technologies that 
could cause disruption in the security sector in the 
future are not mentioned.
Th e Republic of Serbia in its strategy goes a step 
further and better recognizes threats and opportu-
nities, even mentioning some new and potentially 
disruptive technologies. Th e Serbian strategy thus 
warns of the possible “(…) misuse of new tech-
nologies and scientifi c advances in the fi elds of 
informatics, genetic engineering, medicine, mete-
orology and other scientifi c fi elds” (Republika Sr-
bija, 2009: 13). Serbia sees the response to threats 
as based on the “full integration in the internati-
onal communications and information system, 
with the development of a strategic partnership 
with countries that are the carriers of modern 
technologies“(Skupština Republike Srbije, 2009). 
Hungary has also recognized the potential of tech-
nology to generate new threats. Its strategy warns 
on “the possibility of certain actors using scienti-
fi c and technological achievements for non-pe-
aceful purposes” which “poses a strategic threat” 
(Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Hungary, 2012: 4). 
However, disruptiveness is not used as a term, nor 
are technologies having disruptive characteristics 
defi ned.
3.7. Republic of Croatia
Th e National Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Croatia “is the fundamental strategic document 
that defi nes policies and instruments for the re-
alization of the national vision and national inte-
rests and the achievement of security conditions 
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that will enable a balanced and continuous de-
velopment of the state and society“ (Hrvatski sa-
bor, 2017: 1). An insight into the Strategy shows 
that Croatia is no diff erent from the analyzed 
countries in its neighborhood. Th e strategy deals 
with the general statement that in the future, new 
technologies will be a security question that will 
need to be answered, based on the assessment that 
“new technologies are changing all aspects of life 
(…)” (Hrvatski sabor, 2017: 2). It states that “the 
development of information and communicati-
on technologies (...) has created new threats and 
risks.” Whereby “the dependence of society and 
the individual on the Internet and on informati-
on technology poses a particular sensitivity (...) 
increasingly threatening individuals, organizati-
ons and countries” (Hrvatski sabor, 2017: 3). Th e 
trategy addresses technologies at the supportive 
level, while specifi c disruptive technologies are 
not mentioned.
Another important document for analysis is the 
Program of the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia. It mainly deals with technological inno-
vations and new technologies that are important 
for the development and advancement of society, 
on the assumption that “investment in research, 
technological development and innovation will be 
the key generator for the Croatian economy and 
factor in raising the added value and increasing 
the productivity and competitiveness of the Cro-
atian economy in the coming years” (Vlada Repu-
blike Hrvatske, 2016a: 8). 
Nevertheless, this document also did not identify 
the potential risk of new disruptive technologies. 
Moreover, it did not recognize the concept and 
impact that disruptive technologies could have on 
national security at any level, whether regional or 
global.
Based on the initiative of the European Union, 
Croatia has developed a Smart Specialization 
Strategy and an Action Plan for implementing 
the Strategy as a new approach to economic de-
velopment, based on targeted support for R&D 
activities and innovation. Th e aim is to “stimulate 
research, technological development and inno-
vation (…) through the collaboration and joint 
eff orts of the public, scientifi c research and busi-
ness sectors” (Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 2016b: 
1). Th e strategy emphasizes encouraging the de-
velopment of technologies that come within the 
scope of defi ned disruptive technologies such as 
biomedicine, nanotechnology, semiconductors, 
photonics, robotics and the Internet of Th ings 
(Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 2016b).
4.   CONCLUSION
Modern technological development and the 
characteristics of new technologies, especially 
those that have the potential to bedisruptive, si-
gnifi cantly aff ect all aspects of life, and thus the 
character of threats and the security paradigm 
as a whole. A specifi c feature of development is 
the transition of threats from the physical to the 
cybernetic sphere with the accompanying growth 
of the potential to aff ect all aspects of the social 
and individual spectrum, control all aspects of life 
and consequently infl uence both the general and 
the individual level. Th reats can almost be tailor-
made for each individual. Past experience shows 
that defense against cyber threats is very complex. 
In the event of such threats security systems face 
the challenges of detecting threats or attacks, iden-
tifying the carrier of the threat/attack, and defi -
ning the protection and countermeasures. 
Another signifi cant aspect is the transition of the 
development of technologies that can be disrupti-
ve security-wise, as well as their use in a variety of 
areas, ranging from the military and security fi elds 
to private business enterprises– oft en multinatio-
nal corporations -as the main carriers that make 
states dependent on the private sector. 
Finally, the development of the analyzed technolo-
gies is directed towards capacities that will be able 
to act automatically and autonomously, which is 
another signifi cant feature of the security threats 
of the future. Th is increasingly strengthens the 
role of those civilian aspects of the state system, 
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which until now have been largely separate from 
the security sphere; and reinforces the need to 
strengthen the coordination of many public and 
private entities, subsequently complicating the 
planning and operation of the security system. 
Th is poses serious challenges to security systems 
to redefi ne the very basics of their conceptual defi -
nition, planning and action.
Analyzed strategic security documents show that 
countries see the response to the threat of modern 
and potential disruptive technologies as going 
in several directions, primarily by encouraging 
investment in science and scientifi c and techno-
logical development, then by controlling the de-
velopment of these technologies and preventing 
them from falling into the wrong hands, and fi -
nally by encouraging public - private partnerships. 
Th is imposes the need to enhance co-operation 
and the exchange of information, build trust and 
strengthen the interoperability of allies, industry 
and the R&D and other partners.
Th e specifi c properties of the disruptive threats 
analyzed and the shift  of the response focus to the 
civilian sections of society confront traditional mi-
litary alliances such as NATO with problems that 
can hardly be given a comprehensive answer. Gi-
ven the nature of the threat and the EU’s security 
role an EU-NATO cooperation based on common 
security interests can be expected.
In such complex conditions, the importance of 
ensuring a coherent and coordinated action of 
the security system based on the defi ned security 
policies and the legal regulations keeps growing. 
As those are completely new threats according to 
their content and character, a change in the min-
dset and the approach to innovation is necessary 
for the successful planning and operation of the 
system.
A new approach to contemporary disruptive tech-
nologies requires a signifi cant scientifi c and tech-
nological potential, as well as human and fi nancial 
resources, which can be a problem for smaller and 
less developed countries in particular. It is preci-
sely in the case of such countries that cooperation 
becomes a prerequisite for activity. In the case of 
Croatia, this certainly means cooperation that is 
achieved through the EU and the NATO.
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